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Enduring passions : The fallacies of
"gender‑focused" development in
Kenya
Stella Nyancham‑Okemwa
1 "Women in development" (WID) was coined as an acronym, phrase, concept, program,
platform and research focus during the course of the UN Decade for Women 1975‑1985
(Glazer,  1991).  The  coinage  of  "gender  and  development"  (GAD)  in  the  1980's,
theoretically expanded its concept from "women's promotion" to the "improvement of a
quality of life" for all members of the society, regardless of sex, race or class distinction
(Snyder and Tadesse, 1993). Notwithstanding this conceptual expansion, most Kenyans
tend to associate its "welfare" approach with the missionary "promotion of women" in
the 1930's (Sigot, 1995). This paper is a critique on the WID ad GAD tendency to equate
"gender" with "women" and thereby exclude men from "gender‑focused" development. It
seeks to analyse the impact this has had in generating a repertoire of fallacies that have
ultimately contributed to its apparent failure. Its discourse is embedded in a broader
development framework which is briefly outlined below.
The metamorphosis and unfolding of the development discourse
2 Development in the 1950s and 1960s, tended to be viewed from the perspective of the
North (the core) in search of markets, cheap raw materials and labour in the South (the
periphery), so as to sustain their capitalist existence (Schuurman, 1993 :2 ; Snyder and
Tadesse,  1995 :6).  An  "import  substitution"  strategy  was  adopted  to  encourage  the
cumulative  expansion  of  a  "modem"  urban  economy,  designed  to  produce  for  the
international market (Stamp, 1989 ; Schuurman, 1993). Since men were associated with
the larger social, political and economic circles, the focus was on their contribution to
urban and industrial progress.  Women's contribution, viewed from their reproductive
capacity as mothers and wives, was ignored because they were regarded as having little
or no productive impact within these circles (Snyder and Tadesse, 1995 :8). They were
associated with "traditional" subsistence practices in the rural sector, which were viewed
as  obstacles  to  urban  progress  (Stamp,  1989 :12).  They  were  either  dismissed  as  a
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"hindrance to development" or stereotyped as "passive" recipients of "relief aid" (Moser,
1989 ; Snyder and Tadesse, 1995 :9‑10).
3 The  1970s  was  characterised  with  rising  concerns  about  population  growth  and  the
degradation  of  the  environment.  A  new wave  of  theorists  advocated  "sustainable"
development whereby the rich and the poor countries had to make some adjustments, so
as  to  counter  the  potentially  catastrophic  effect  global  trade  was  having  on  the
environment  (Schuurman,  1993).  The  promotion  of  women was  viewed as  a  feasible
strategy  to  provide  families  with  the  minimum  requirements  for  consumption  and
essential  community services (Schuurrnan,  1993 :  124).  Socialist  theorists  advocated a
"human resources" approach whereby women were viewed as being pertinent rather
than peripheral to national development" (Snyder and Tadesse, 1995 : 10). This approach
paved the way for the current "gender‑focused" development (Snyder and Tadesse, 1995 :
II).
4 Towards the latter years of the 1970's, trade in the South suffered from the combined
effects  of  the  declining  global  economy,  deteriorating  terms  of  trade  and,  increased
market restrictions (Woestman, 1994). The South had to make some adjustments in their
trade and governance practices so as be legible for loans to repay their debts and recover
from the crisis  (Woestman,  1994 :6).  The International  Monetary,  Fund (IMF) and the
World Bank imposed "Structural Adjustment Programmes" (SAPs). These SAPs include
the democratisation of governments,  privatisation, deregulation and, retrenchment of
the public sector and liberalisation of markets. The promotion of women was viewed as a
viable  strategy  of  alleviating  a  number  of  SAPs‑related  problems  and/or  indirectly
containing those that could not be avoided. Small women's organisations were expected
to take over almost  overnight  from the state,  without  time,  resources  or  experience
(Schuurman, 1993 : 174).
5 The term "gender", since the beginning of its use in the development circles, has been
distorted in order to fit into a westernised vision of women 's status and their access to
resources. This paper will focus on the two "gender" concepts that are encapsulated in
the WID and GAD frameworks. WID can be traced to the 1970's liberal/radical feminists
reaction to population programmes that were aimed at controlling women's fertility and
alleviating poverty (Stamp, 1990 : 15‑16 ; Snyder and Tadesse, 1993 :12). They described
women  as  having  a  triple  role  in  production  (income  generation),  reproduction
(biological and social)  and in community management (women's networking systems)
(Moser, 1989). Development should capitalise on women's triple role so as to make them
efficient managers of poverty and thereby buffer the shocks of SAPs policies (Schuurman,
1993 : 170 ; Stamp, 1990).
6 GAD  can  be  traced  from  the  Marxist/socialist  feminists'  reaction  against  capitalism
(Stamp, 1990). They advocated an "equality" approach which viewed women as victims of
male‑skewed capitalist structures which sustained and perpetuated unequal distribution
of  resources,  power imbalances  and lack of  reciprocity  between sexes  (Stamp,  1990 :
16‑19 ; Moser, 1989). In the mid‑1980s, local feminists adopted the "empowerment"
approach  which  cut  across  class  lines  and  embed  notions  of  gender  within  these
structures  (Snyder  and  Tadesse,  1995 :  13‑14 ;  Dolphyne,  1991 ;  Nyanchama‑Okemwa,
1996). They sought to use women's "triple role" politically so as to stimulate a number of
structural changes which were more attuned to their practical needs.
7 In the late 1980's, the advocates of the "empowerment" approach popularised the term
"gender" as a replacement to "women" (Snyder and Tadesse, 1995 : 14). Its proponents
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claimed that "men and women play different and yet complementary roles in society and
therefore have different needs and strategies (Sigot, 1995 :2). Patriarchal structures have
the propensity of aggravating their inherently asymmetrical gendered relationships in the
spheres of production and reproduction, inside and outside the household (Sigot, 1995 ;
Stamp, 1990). Il is the suggestion of this paper that the subordination and exploitation of
women does not take place between sexes precisely nor is it solely triggered by the se
underlying gender asymmetries. My critique of the WID and GAD frameworks that are
embedded in the "gender‑focused" development will  be limited to the following four
fallacies :
• women are "victims" of patriarchal structures
• women are "passive recipients" of "gender‑focused" development
• women networks are "homogeneous" thus its members are mutually concerned with
addressing common issues
• "women's Bureau" epitomises the success of both the WID and GAD interventions
Women as victims of Patriarchal structures : the first fallacy
8 The  first  fallacy  is  founded  upon  the  assumption  that  the  women  for  whom
"gender‑focused" development is targeted, exist in societies that are skewed in favour of
men. The Kenyan statutory law excludes women from both control and ownership of
resources  white  protecting  their  rights  of  access  and  use.  Conversely,  traditional
valuations of the land do not allude to absolute ownership perse, but rather to gender
differentiated access to, use and control of the land. In this sense, one can only talk of
relative  or  partial  ownership  that  is  organised  around male  and  female  hierarchies,
wherein men are just as vulnerable as women to other men and women. Nowadays, the
land rights of impoverished, rural‑based illiterate men have been impinged upon by a
number of wealthy, elite, urban‑based and politically powerful men and women. These
local bourgeoisie have the political and monetary clout to hoard, lease, commodity or
forcibly appropriate land from their impoverished and non‑elite kin.
9 Currently, land has became one of the most valued and contested resource in combating
the negative effects of inflation, food deficit, loss of urban real wages, underemployment,
unemployment,  collapse  of  health,  education  and  social  infrastructure  (Francis,
1995 :201).  These  factors  have  the  propensity  of  exacerbating  the  existing  power
imbalances between the dominant rich minority and the marginalised poor. In this sense,
both  men  and  women  today,  are  more  concerned  with  protecting  their  gender
differentiated rights of access to, use and control rather than pursuing the notion of "who
owns the land ? ". However, since men in general (and recently, wealthy women elite) are
the  official  title  deed holders,  impoverished,  rural‑based illiterate  women are  at  the
loosing end of this struggle for land rights. 
10 Research indicates that power relations with respect to the land in most agro‑pastoral
societies is in the hands of senior men, who collude to limit younger men and women's
access to and use of land (Hartman, 1979). Since women in these societies have to defer to
the authority of men, WID policies presume that they are structurally denied access to,
use and control of the land. Similarly, GAD policies, on the basis of this assumption, are
aimed at  promoting women's  interests  at  the expense of  men who may be similarly
disadvantaged. The WID and GAD approaches tend to draw a sharp distinction between
class  and  gender,  whereby  the  latter  is  viewed  in  terms  of  relations  of  human
reproduction.  However,  their  conception  of  these  relations  differs  such  that  WID
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emphasises  women's  childbearing  and  rearing  capacities  while  GAD  stresses  on  the
asymmetric gender and generational relations (Henn, 1988 :27).
11 The WID and GAD policies tend to overlook the fact that cultural ideas about gender can
be  used  by  both  men  and  women  to  advance  their  respective  interests  regarding
productive resources (Bulow, 1992).  Moreover,  both men and women manipulate and
reinterpret customary as well as externally induced ideas about gender. These gender
dynamics tend to be obscured when the status of women is viewed from the "mode of
economy"  perspective  that  is  encapsulated  in  patriarchy  (Stamp,  1989 :75).  This
patriarchal thinking emerges from a theoretical model of class relations whereby male
patriarchs,  as  heads of  households,  control  their  dependants'  access to the means of
production (Henn, 1988 :28). In the pre‑capitalist mode of production, patriarchal control
was associated with heavy labour burdens for women, some work for male dependants
and little or no work for eiders. Similarly, the capitalist mode of production that favours
wage differentials  and profit‑oriented economic  growth,  has  created male‑dominated
class distinctions between the "haves" and the "have‑nots" (Stichter and Parpart, 1988).
12 The  idea  of  patriarchy  that  is  embedded  in  the  WID  and  GAD  gender  conceptions
presumes a universal domination of women by men (Stamp, 1989 :75). Similarly ingrained
in this patriarchal thinking is a dichotomy between a "public" male sphere of politics and
economy  and  a  "private"  female  sphere  of  family  and  community  welfare  (Stamp,
1989 :116). GAD presumes an existence of a uniform male "public" space or style in which
women are excluded (Stamp,  1989 :  115).  It  also presumes an existence of  a  uniform
female public in whose interest policy is made. These assumptions give rise to the idea
that formal political legitimacy can only be gauged in terms of an idiom of public interest
or  common  welfare.  WID  tends  to  bracket  local  women  into  "private",  "domestic",
"invisible", "dominated" spheres that fall outside of the aforementioned "public" spheres
(Stamp, 1989 ; Stichter and Parpart, 1988).
13 This "public" and "private" dichotomy is irrelevant in societies wherein ail individuals
are equally dependant on a collective that was larger than the nuclear family. In the past,
eider men and women,  either singly or in age group collectivities,  were credited for
making decisions on behalf  of  their  dependants,  about socially defined activities  and
responsibilities.  These  activities,  responsibilities  and  the  decisions  taken about  them
constituted  the  public  life  of  the  society  as  a  whole  (Stamp,  1989 :76).  In  the
contemporary  Kenyan society,  men and women tend to  perceive  themselves  and be
perceived  by  those  with  whom  they  are  relating  in  terms  of  certain  idiosyncratic
valuations of maleness and femaleness. The public sphere is constituted by the context
and content of addressing issues that differentially affect or that are differentially effected
by gendered individuals interacting with each other. These interactions are mediated by
culturally‑defined ideologies and practices of male and female behaviour.
14 Valuations of gender cannot be understood in isolation from the cultural perceptions
from which they emerge and into which the y are embedded. These perceptions in turn,
are  rendered  meaningful  by  individuals  in  their  interaction  with  each  other  and  in
relation to the contextual realities with which they are confronted. In this sense, male
and female roles are not mere dichotomies that are fixed, polarised or dually opposed to
each other. Men and women's roles do not necessarily mirror each other in terms of the
image and the imaged. These roles are mutually referencing in a relationally negotiated
and complementary sense.  Similarly,  the form and structure of the private sphere is
valued and upheld as such inasmuch as it is embedded in the public sphere and vice
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versa. In order to understand local conceptualisations of gender, dichotomies such as
"dominant/dominated" ;  "public/private"  and  by  implication,  "modern/traditional",
must be abandoned (Stamp, 1989).
15 Since the primacy of women in their own realms of authority within the private and the
public sphere continues to determine the choices they make and influence the valuations
of their status, WID should explore the reasons for this persistence rather than dismiss it
(Stamp, 1989 :84). This paper suggests an alternative perspective that views women from
a "gender dynamics" perspective that embeds the pre‑colonial/pre‑monetarised economy
in  the  contemporary  capitalist  one.  In  the  past,  gender  dynamics  ordered  men  and
women's  relations  of  kinship,  lineage,  residence,  marriage  systems,  land  succession,
usufructuary  rights,  division  of  labour,  local  power/knowledge  and local  networking
patterns.  Today,  these  dynamics  have  not  been  abandoned  but  have  been  adjusted,
modified and reinterpreted to accommodate men and women's relations vis‑a‑vis the
political/legal system, informal power structures, ethnicity and paternalism (Macharia,
1997).
16 An analysis of the transformations that occurred in the pre‑colonial era would give a
better understanding of the gender dynamics in the current capitalist economy. These
dynamics influence the choices men and women make when negotiating their status with
respect to each other and the society as a whole. Their gender valuations as well as their
gauges of wealth and well being tend to shift in response to both traditional and modern
stimuli (Bulow, 1992 :522). Accordingly. my critique embeds women in their pre‑colonial/
pre‑capitalist past in order to outline some culture‑specific valuations of their autonomy.
It  also  outlines  some  of  the  extenuating  factors  that  have  stripped  women  of  their
autonomy and made them structurally  dependent  on men.  I  shall  now illustrate  my
critique, based on data collected during my fieldwork in 1997 among the Gusii of south
western Kenya. 
The status of women in the pre‑colonial Gusii society
17 The Gusii patrilineal, polygynous, and horticultural heritage is familiar and comparable
to a large number of rural communities that have been described by various authors
(Bulow,  1992 ;  Francis,  1995 ;  Oboler,  1994 ;  Hakansson,  1987 ;  1989).  However,
contemporary Gusii must in no way be regarded as a culturally homogeneous group. The
Gusii, just as most locai communities in Kenya, are characterised by varied gradations of
intra‑ and inter‑social and cultural diversity. These variations may be attributed to their
encounter  with  Catholic  and  Protestant  missions,  compulsory  education,  national
administration, market encroachment, interaction with other ethnic groups and local or
regional migration. In spite of this apparent heterogeneity, the Gusii tend to perceive and
thereby distinguish  themselves  from other  cultural  groups,  as  being  a  homogeneous
group with a common cultural heritage.
18 In the pre‑colonial past, the Gusii organised themselves around a patrilineal structure
whereby descent was traced through the male line. Marriage was virilocal, however, men
were prohibited from marrying women from nearby. The clans were exogamous. Women
were considered as being strangers in their husband's clan not only because they had to
move from distant clans but also because they were ritually restricted from forming any
lasting  links  with  their  own  families.  In  a  comparable  study  among  their  Kipsigis
neighbours, men preferentially married from nearby clans. Kipsigis women were able to
organise themselves into ritually and politically legitimate networks that were largely
comprised of their own natal kin (Bulow, 1992).
Enduring passions : The fallacies of "gender‑focused" development in Kenya...
Bulletin de l'APAD, 20 | 2000
5
19 Bridewealth  was  the  token  of  marriage,  as  it  transmitted  ail  rights  in  the  woman'
productive and reproductive capacities to her husband's lineage.  Bridewealth severed
women's  jural  links  to  their  fathers  and  brothers,  except  in  the  event  of  divorce.
However, it mediated a number of ritual obligations which compelled husbands to allow
their wives to make occasion al visits to their own families. These visits were usually of a
ritual rather than of an affective nature. Bridewealth transmission among the Gusii is
unlike the one among their Luhyia neighbours, where it legitimised Luhyia women' status
as mothers and wives in their husbands' clan without relieving their own fathers' and
brothers'  jural  and  ritual  obligations  towards  them.  In  this  sense,  bridewealth
strengthened rather than alienated them as daughters and sisters of their natal clan .
(Hakansson, 1994).
20 Among  the  Gusii,  the  primary  domestic  unit  was  the  compound  (omochie),  which
comprised of  a  polygynous senior  male (omogaka bw'omochie),  his  wives'  hearth‑holds
(chinyomba) and his married sons and their respective wives' hearth‑holds. Husband did
not have a separate dwelling during their physically productive years however when they
became old and weak, they were allowed to dwell in a hut (egesa) constructed as part of
their  first  wife's  property.  Men  who  were  not  yet  considered  as  being  physically
productive  i.e.  unmarried sons  were  also  allowed to  dwell  in  a  separate  hut  (esaiga) 
constructed as part of their respective mother's property. 
21 Historically, the Gusii shared a common language and cultural heritage but never acted as
a unit (Hakansson, 1987 :30). Tracing their descent to a common ancestor, Mogusii, the
Gusii society was organised around a maximally expanding lineage that. fragmented into
semi‑autonomous  family  units.  Membership  and  belonging  within  these  units  was
reckoned in terms of interlocking claims to land succession and ritual. : compensation
(Hakansson, 1987). The ramifications of succession and compensation were traced in all
levels of interaction namely, individual, family, lineage, clan and Gusii as a whole. The
Gusii lineage system was also ordered around age sets whereby men and women who
were circumcised in the same cycle formed a bracketed cluster of individuals. Spatial and
social norms were gauged in terms of mutual reciprocity within and between age sets, in
the production, processing and control of resources of the land. Wives were integrated
into their husband's age grade and had to be accorded due respect, regardless of the fact
that most of them were much younger that his age mates.
22 Since they were not necessarily comprised of individuals of the same age or sex, relations
within  and  between  age  sets  was  fraught  with  tensions,  competitiveness  and  power
imbalances.  Notwithstanding  these  internal  age  differences  and  external  sexual
distinction, both male and female individuals who were circumcised in the same year
tended to perceive each other as being "those who gather together" (abagisangio). 
23 Members of an age set considered each other as being equal in status and influence but
had to defer to those senior age sets be respected those of younger ones. Positions of
leadership  and  authority  was  accorded  to  those  who  succeeded  in  containing  these
inherent age set tensions, instilling social harmony and thereby promoting the interests
of its members. These positions were delineated further on the basis of gender such that
female age sets had to defer to those of their male counterparts, within an equivalent
hierarchy.
24 Access to land was reckoned in terms of male succession but absolute ownership did not
exist. Land was regarded as belonging to the founding occupants, who then transmitted
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corporate custodial rights to ail the succeeding occupants. In this sense, land ordered
their past, present and future relations. Male elders were accorded the ultimate authority
and control in monitoring their descendants' relations with respect to the land. Their
status was gauged in terms of their success in controlling their respective sons and in
instilling  mutual  harmony  and  co‑operation  within  and  between  their  wives'
hearth‑holds. Similarly, sons' statuses was gauged in terms of their deference to their
fathers and their success in containing tensions amongst their respective wives.
25 Women elders were also perceived as the custodians of the corporate land by virtue of
their role in implementing and perpetuating the male elders' ancestrally derived voice of
authority. Women who were past child‑bearing age gained equal respect as male elders
and  were  often  consulted  during  decision‑making  process  (see  also  Lambert,  1965).
Female eiders were credited for chastising both men and women who failed to adhere to
the prescribed norms of behaviour. Accordingly, they tended to be viewed as the moral
and ethical guardians who monitored behaviour and meted out the sanctions that had
been imposed by male eiders. They also tended to be viewed as confidantes and mentors
by all newly married, childless and recently widowed in‑married women. Male and female
elders' spheres of influence in decision‑making and control over resources were regarded
as being simultaneously hierarchical and egalitarian. Accordingly, neither the male nor
the female eiders could interfere with the other's sphere of influence or undermine their
respective control and authority.
26 Fathers were charged with the responsibility of allocating land equitably amongst their
sons and providing them with the necessary cattle to acquire their first wife. Thereafter,
each son was charged with the responsibility apportioning their inherited land and cattle
equitably amongst their wives'.  This property,  which was inalienable from the wives'
respective  hearth‑holds  became  the  heritable  property  of  sons.  All  in‑married  were
therefore accorded autonomous control and custodial rights over their sons' heritable
property,  which was inalienably attached to their  respective hearth‑holds.  Since this
property was viewed as a portion of the clan's heritable corporate holding, they had to
defer to their husband and by extension, the agnatic clan elders' overarching authority
over its distribution and allocation to their sons (Gluckman 1950 :195‑9, Oboler 1994 :342).
In this sense,  sons acquired a major share of their inheritance from their father but
through their mother's hearth‑hold while wives acquired a major share of their property
rights through their husbands' share of the clan's heritable corporate holding (see also
Bulow, 1992). Fathers often reserved a tract of land (emonga) which was exclusively used
by them to reinvest in successive marriages or to expand their sons' heritable holding.
Wives and children were not obliged to work on this land since any food produced by
their labour was automatically considered as being part of their respective hearth holds.
Consequently,  husbands had to rely on their own efforts and the willingness of their
age‑mates' and grandchildren to work on this tract of land.
27 The distribution of property within hearth‑holds and the co‑operation between the wives
heading their respective hearth‑holds, was considered as being relatively autonomous
and mutually exclusive. This property not only formed the basis by which the male and
female spheres of influence were determined, but also the way family members were
oriented and later fragmented into semi‑autonomous units. Relations between children of
the same mother was strengthened by the mother while those between children of one
father and different mothers was strengthened by the father. In this sense, the bond
between children of the same father and mother was stronger than that of one father and
Enduring passions : The fallacies of "gender‑focused" development in Kenya...
Bulletin de l'APAD, 20 | 2000
7
different mothers. The latter cluster formed distinct and separate family grouping that
was  held  together  by  the  father.  Once  the  father  died,  all  these  family  groupings
fragmented  into  semi‑autonomous  units  that  were  held  together  by  their  respective
mothers, but under the auspices of eldest sons or husbands' brothers.
28 Women were accorded due respect as the representatives of their fathers' and husbands'
agnatic  clan.  They  were  also  accorded  due  respect  as  the  bearers  and  nurturers  of
potential  lineage heads of  their  husband's  agnatic  clan as  well  as  the producers and
processors of  grains and vegetables.  So how the women themselves gauge their  own
statuses ? Firstly, in terms of their ability to provide for the family's consumption and
well‑being as well  as their custodial  role to protect and expand their sons'  heritable
property.  Secondly,  in terms of their ability to promote their husbands'  influence by
being hospitable to his friends and relatives. Thirdly, in terms of their capacity to defer to
their husbands' authority and maintain family solidarity. Relations between spouses and
amongst wives was fraught with mutual conflict and competition for their shared and
therefore, shareable resources. Wives' statuses was largely predicated upon their ability
to contain the Inherent tensions embedded in their conflicting and contradictory roles as
wives and mothers.
29 Valuations of women's autonomy were sustained by customary ideas relating to their
status as "heads of autonomous hearth holds" in their respective husbands' homesteads.
Men only acquired a residence in their youth (esaiga) or when they were elderly (egesa), 
hence  husbands  had  to  negotiate  their  habitation  between  their  wives'  dwellings
(chillyomba). They were prohibited from entering wives' granaries or appropriating the
land  and  cattle  that  was  attached  to  their  respective  hearth  holds.  They  were  also
prohibited from interfering with their  wives'  decisions on producing,  processing and
distributing grain for the family's consumption and well‑being. Husbands' statuses were
firstly gauged in terms of their ability to provide their wives with the means to fulfil
these functions. Secondly in terms of their ability to contain any conflict between spouses
or amongst sons for their shared and therefore shareable resources. Thirdly, their ability
to ex tend their wives' hospitality to proximate kin and thereby forge bonds of affiliation
that expanded their political influence over them. Fourthly, their ability to compensate
for any shortfalls in their wives harvest that interfered with their capacity to feed the
family or be hospitable 10 proximate kin.
30 Gender discourse tends to depict male succession and autonomy in allocating resources
as contributing to a devaluation of women's status however, the converse is true in many
cases. Women have a strong influence in determining the nature of male succession and
allocation of resources since men can only gain access to land through their respective
mothers'  hearth‑hold property.  Similarly,  husbands  have a  great  affinity  and loyalty
towards their wives', primarily because of their custodial role over their sons heritable
property and secondarily because of their ability to expand it. Men were and still are
totally dependent on women for their livelihood and their future. Nowadays, husbands
can purchase land elsewhere or appropriate an unreasonable portion of their heritable
property  as  emonga  and thereby legitimately  curtail  their  wives'  and sons'  claims to
resources. When they utilise their heritable property for cash crops, a number of men
also  tend  to  rely  on  paid  labour  both as  a  means  of  excluding  their  wives  labour
contributions as well as pre‑empting their claims to the benefits accrued.
Extenuating factors that that stripped women of their autonomy
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31 The  colonial  and  missionary  influence  had  a  most  damaging  impact  on  women's
autonomy. Colonisation, which coincided with the industrial revolution, necessitated a
demand for natural resources for the industries back home (Kameri‑Mbote & Kiai, 1993).
Since the subsistence economy of the colonised populace was both self sufficient and
non‑commodity based, the primary objective of the colonisers was to disrupt this self
sufficiency.  Initial1y,  this  objective  was  attained  through  the  colonialists'  concerted
expropriation, usurpation and hoarding of land for cash crop production as well as the
introduction of migrant and/or forced labour. However, by the 1930's and 1940's, this
strategy had failed to disrupt the local economy and land began to be experienced as
scarce or contested resource. The integration of cash crop trade in the local economy
coupled with the introduction of taxes and land tenure laws, had the desired effect of
disrupting their self‑sufficiency.
32 The 1954 Swynnerton Land Reform Plan bracketed land into artificial boundaries and
stipulated that any claims of ownership could only be legitimated by title deeds (Bulow,
1992 :534). These land tenure laws were greatly influenced by the Victorian and Christian
family  model,  whereby the  male  household  head was  accorded an authoritative  and
paternalistic position as the "breadwinner". Men were accorded title deeds to ancestral
land, thereby stratifying the previously malleable access to, use and control of the land
into a fixated bracket of male ownership (see also Bulow, 1992). Gusii men's obligation
and responsibility to accord women custodial rights over their sons' heritable property
was compromised this western ideology of exclusive rights of ownership (See also Bulow,
1992 :535). The 1950's and 1960's was therefore characterised by a tendency of local male
inhabitants to hoard or appropriate land belonging to their migrant kin, many of whom
were absent from their homesteads for long periods. Land succession on the basis of
fragmentation,  coupled  by  a  dramatic  rise  in  population  and  a  sharp  decline  in
subsistence economy also contributed to the experience of land as a scarce and contested
resource. This perceived or real demographic crisis was compounded by the dichotomies
that started to be made by the colonial and post colonial governments and later by the
development  agencies. Local  communities  were  stereotyped as  being  comprised  of  a
"private",  "rural",  "poor"  and  "provincial"  dominated  population  as  opposed  to  the
"public", "urban", "wealthy" and "progressive" dominant one.
33 In the Gusii context, the impact of assuming that the husband was the household head
and breadwinner was a feminisation of his overarching authority and influence over his
wives' hearth‑holds. The wives' house property (chinyomba), which was exclusively their
domain,  was  consolidated  into  the  (emonga)  which  belonged  to  their  husband.  This
consolidation had the impact of aggravating the inherent gender conflicts with respect to
land allocation as well as the production, distribution and storage of resources. Husbands
gained control over cash crops produced on their wives' hearth‑hold property but were
ritually denied access to it since wives retained their autonomous control over the crops
stored in their granaries. Husbands who encroached on their wives' subsistence economy
were accused of "eating their children" because they deterred their wives' capacity to
feed the family. Similarly accused were those who felt entitled to hoard, lease, lend or sell
land, since they impinged upon their wives' custodial rights over sons heritable property.
Men's  strategic  impingement  of  their  wives  hearth‑hold  authority  altered  spousal
relations from relative mutual autonomy to asymmetrical dependence. Similar accounts
describe  how  men's  and  women's  domains  dissolved,  thereby  devaluing  the  mutual
respect, complementarity and reciprocity between genders (Bulow, 1992 :535).
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34 Land commodification may have contributed to the structural invisibility and devaluation
of women as heads of their respective hearth‑holds but the underlying evaluation of their
autonomy prevailed.  Today,  women continue to be viewed as custodians of  heritable
family holding despite the fact that men, as title deed holders are empowered by the law
to override their legitimate, culturally‑sanctioned claims to it.  A number of husbands
have started to resort to the law so as to legitimise their non legitimate encroachment
into women's  spheres  of  influence.  Conversely,  wives  have.  remained sceptical  about
seeking legal recompense from laws which they perceive as legalising (their husbands')
illegality. According to some older informants, a number of women migrated to the urban
centres to escape from this "non‑legitimate" male control. There is scant data on how the
Gusii women reacted to these gender transformations, however, similar accounts have
been described by other authors (Wipper, 1985 :13 ; , Oboler, 1985 :173 ; Bulow, 1992 : 536 ;
White, 1988 : 139‑160).
35 The development of an urban capitalist economy and the imposition of a taxation system
had  the  desired  effect  of  disrupting  any  semblance  of  self‑sufficiency  by  artificially
inserting a need for money. Initially, the colonised populace was reluctant to engage in
labour migration because it involved working as cooks, house‑boys and farm hands, jobs
which were typically associated with women. Moreover, the work was not only low‑paid
but it  also compelled the labour migrants to be far away from their  family for long
periods  of  time.  It  is  hardly  surprising  therefore,  that  labour  migration was  at  first
stimulated by force and only later, by new cash needs such as taxation, clothing, cash to
purchase bridewealth cattle (Francis, 1995 :200). Most migrant labourers who worked in
low‑paid jobs on European farms and plantations became "squatters", living' in "reserve
settlements" at the fringes of colonialists property. A small educated minority gained
access to better‑paid jobs as teachers, clerks and junior administrators in the emergent
urban centres (Francis, 1995 :202).
36 Women who migrated to the urban centres engaged in various forms of commodified
domestic labour. The various waves of women's migration tended to shift in response to
the urban capitalist economy and the increasing dependence of local communities on
commodity goods and services. White described women's migrant labour as a strategy in
replenishing their men‑folk's diminished labour capacities by , "feeding, entertaining and
relaxing" them for a price (1988 : 140). Since male migrants did not eat enough to marry
or  purchase  long‑term domestic  services,  these  women  filled  the  void  by  becoming
"short‑term wives" for a stipulated price. According to White, there were three waves of
women's migration into Nairobi (1988 : 139‑142). Firstly, the watembezi (app.1900‑1924)
whereby  women  walked  about  (Swahili  word,  Kutembea‑  to  walk)  selling  hot  meals,
snacks,  bath  water  and  beverages  to  male  migrant  labourers.  Secondly,  the  malaya 
(app.1922‑1939) who offered the same services in the privacy of owned or leased rooms
(Swahili phrase "mali ya haya"‑  affluence/property from shame). Thirdly, the wazi wazi
(app.1934‑1946) whereby a number of the older, established entrepreneurs started fixing
prices  so  as  to  limit  the  encroachment  of  younger  migrants  into  their  spheres  of
influence.  This  wave  was  characterised  by  open competitiveness  (Swahili  word  wazi‑ 
open, exposed or indiscreet) between women migrants. The colonial government viewed
these women's activities as "unhygienic" and "repugnant" and thus tended to severely
monitor and restrict their movements (White, 1988).
37 The 1950's and 1960' s, triggered a new wave of women migrants, offering the three types
of domestic services in the hope of capitalising on post‑war benefits. The emergence of
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these  women coincided with the  government  plans  for  recovery and reconstruction,
Where by these women's activities started to be viewed as being problematic. This period
was characterised by open militancy of women against the concerted aggression from the
police and elders  back home,  to control  their  movement and cripple their  economic
power  base  (White,  1988).  Women  migrants  risked  being  stigmatised  as  prostitutes,
however, many of them were credited for investing in their sons' education and thereby,
residually expanding their husbands'  influence (see also Bulow, 1992).  Since both the
colonial government and the missionaries were organised around a male labour pool,
there was a tendency to invest in sons education, as a measure of ensuring that the y got
a salaried job and thereafter invested in the care of their siblings. This sons' preference
also emerged from the tradition al valuation of daughters, as being destined for marriage
and therefore, not in a position to ever engage in paid employment. Unfortunately, this
male bias, coupled with the alien notion of male‑headed homes, paved the way for elders
and by extension, husbands and sons, to control all incomes of their womenfolk. 
38 Access  to  mission  schools  was  predicated  upon  conversion  and  a  demonstrable
commitment to denounce and disassociate from "barbaric" customs such as circumcision,
bridewealth, polygamy and wife inheritance. These customs formed the basis by which
women  derived  their  hearth‑hold  based  autonomy,  thus  women  tended  to  be  very
sceptical about conversion. Nonetheless some women opted for conversion firstly, as a
means  of  enabling  their  sons  to  get  married  without  the  attendant  constraints  of
bridewealth transactions. Secondly as a means of detaching themselves from the custom
of  widow‑inheritance  that  legitimised  the  competing  family  interests  in  their
productivity. And thirdly, as a means of becoming accepted into the income‑generating
networks  that  were  funded  by  the  missions.  Most  Gusii  women shied  away  from
conversion and only started accepting missionary education in the 1950's and 1960's.
When one wife in a polygamous home was converted, the others viewed her actions as a
form  of  betrayal  because  it  afforded  her  an  unfair  advantage  over  them.  This  was
particularly the case when the converted wife, as the officially recognised spouse, took
advantage of her position to promote her own interests al the expense of her co‑wives. 
39 Dramatic  changes in  rural‑urban  linkages  also  contributed  to  the  loss  of  women's
autonomy. Women migrants attained a measure of autonomy as traders and property
owners in the urban centres. The colonial policy that promoted male labour migrations
10 plantations, however, compelled rural women to take over farm responsibilities of
their absent men‑folk (see also Bulow, 1992 ; Francis, 1995). Cash crop production in the
country declined sharply as a consequence of women's tendency to prioritise subsistence
over cash crop production. The type of cash crops that women cared for was limited, and
restricted to female are as of economy (grain and vegetable gardening) and investment
(children's education). The 1950's and 1960's were characterised with reverse migration
whereby migrant men, armed with title deeds, took over from their wives and prioritised
cash crop production at the expense of their wives' subsistence economy. Men started to
appropriate  land  that  was  allocated  to  subsistence,  forcing  women  to  provide  for
consumption in ever‑shrinking fields. Moreover, wives' labour contribution to the cash
crop production and processing increased with little or no financial  returns from its
trade. Focus on cash crop production and trade was also characterised and shaped by
external influences such as market encroachment and urbanisation.
40 The creation of high‑wage sectors during the colonial era and the stabilisation of the
labour market in the post‑independence era triggered a wave of rural‑urban migration.
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The urban sector was dependent upon a stable rural cash crop economy which in turn
was  expected  to  benefit  from  the  dynamic  links  of  wage  employment  and  farm
investment  (Francis,  1995 :201).  Conversely,  most  farmers  regarded land primarily  as
means of  survival  and thus tended to invest in cash crop production and trade only
inasmuch as it  did not interfere with their wives'  subsistence horticultural  economy.
Secondarily,  land  was  regarded  as  being  their  sons'  inheritance  hence  cash  crop
production and trade tended to be viewed as a means of expanding their sons' heritable
holding rather than the accumulation of profit. The benefits accrued from cash crop trade
as well as the remittances from sons and daughters who had migrated to the urban sector
was  invested  in  consumption  and  education  of  their  siblings  rather  than  on  farm
expansion (Francis, 1995 :201).
41 The falling urban real wages during the 1970's economic crisis coupled with the negative
impacts of SAP's triggered a new wave of reverse migration to the rural area. This put a
strain on rural‑urban linkages, that compelled farmers to prioritise on the production
and trade of subsistence crops. The combined effect of real (overpopulation), structural
(ruralisation,  land  hoarding)  and  virtual  (land  succession  based  on  fragmentation)
demographic  crises  have  rendered  cash  crop  production  in  the  rural  sector  as  a
non‑viable investment (Francis, 1995). The current decline in cash crop trade is not only
affected  by  the  micro‑economy  of  "production  for  survival"  but  also  indirectly  by
macro‑economic  issues  such as  corrupt  bureaucracy,  surplus  extraction  and unequal
trade terms. Similarly criticised is the fact that farmers are encouraged to produce crops
that are not conducive to their needs, or on land that is not suitable for its production.
Even  in  areas  suited  to  the  production  of  higher‑value  cash  crops,  farmers  are
handicapped by poor infrastructure, lack of appropriate technology, long distance from
the co‑operatives (Macharia, 1997).
42 The Kenyan economy is largely dependent upon the pace and pattern of the agricultural
sector, which ideally should pro vide two‑thirds of its export (Mach aria, 1997 :23). The
fact  that  it  has  no  substantive  minerals  for  export  and  the  industrial  sector  is  still
forming, implies that the economic crisis is predicated upon the declining agricultural
production.  Paradoxically,  research  seems  to  indicate  that  over  the  years,  the  full
potentiality of the land's agricultural capacity has been poorly exploited (Francis, 1995).
The government is less concerned with addressing issues of individual ownership than it
is with the diminishing percentage of the land that lends itself to agricultural production
(Macharia, 1997). This concern is triggered by the fact that less than 20% is arable and
more than 40% is  classified as being non‑conducive to agricultural  production (p.23).
Moreover, only 19% of the arable land is free from inherent limitations, much of it in the
hands of a few financially and politically powerful men and women (Sigot, 1995 : 6).
The second fallacy : the local mechanisms of development
43 The  second  fallacy  is  founded  on  the  assumption  that  women's  contribution  to
development can only be assessed in terms of their productivity and reproductivity as
mothers and wives. WID tends to assess women's integration into development in terms
of their contribution family welfare. Its strategies are structured around existing and/or
emerging women networks. The ultimate goal of the se strategies is to reorganise these
networks in such a way as to enable its members to maximally expand their productive
and reproductive outputs. WID promotes women‑specific, income‑generating projects so
as to alleviate a number of constraints that are considered as being a deterrent to their
efficacy and efficiency. It not only obscures the existence of women's local mechanisms of
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development but also has the propensity of stereotyping them as being passive.  This
stereotype is echoed in the colonial literature that tended to depict colonised women as
being "muted", "subordinated" and "dependent on men" (Callaway, 1984). Contrary to
these stereotypes, the Gusii illustration indicates that women were viewed as being fully
autonomous and active social facilitators.
44 In the 1950s and 1960s, women migrants who had contributed to family welfare through
prostitution,  were literally  harassed off paved streets  to  create "desirable  residential
areas" for the emergent local bourgeoisie (White, 1988 : 142). Similarly victimised were
those  who  rejected  conversion  as  well  as  those  who  rebelled  politically  against  the
colonial government. Missionaries stigmatised these women as being prostitutes while
colonialists burnt down homes and farms of women activists who had supported their
men‑folk  during  the  pre‑independence  political  struggles  (Mugo,  1975).  The  colonial
government,  in the guise of  ridding the urban centre of  "unsanitary conditions" and
assisting families to cope with the negative social and economic impact of the political
unrest, initiated a concerted effort to address women's issues. They sought to deconstruct
women 's  tradition al  roles  as  wives  and mothers  and thereby deflate  their  publicly
articulated incentive to support their men‑folk. This concern was shared by missionaries
who scorned local women's "excessive sexuality" as well as local eiders who felt that their
militancy and activism was loading to the neglect of the farms (Oduol, 1993).
45 The government's strategy for curbing women's prostitution and political activism was to
lure them into the colonialists' wives' clubs that existed at the time. Financial and trade
incentives  were  used  to  encourage  club  membership  and thereafter,  co‑ordinate  the
disparate  efforts  of  women's  networks  to  form  an  umbrella  organisation  called
Maendeleo  Ya  Wanawake  Organisation  (MYWO).  This  organisation,  promised  its
mel1lbers  subsidised  training  in  income‑generating  arts  and  crafts  skills,  that  were
designed  to  alleviate  some  of  their  wifely  and  mothering  constraints.  However,
membership turned out to be a double betrayal when both the conditions for membership
and the nature of the prol1lised training fell short of their expectations. Membership, on
the  one  hand,  was  privileged  to  those  who had  collaborated  with  the  colonisers  by
fabricating or betraying political activists. On the other hand, training was focused on the
attainl1lent  of  non‑market  oriented  welfare  skills  such  as  home‑making,  child  care,
nutrition,  hygiene  and  less  in  market  oriented  trade  skills  such  as  arts  and  crafts
(Khasiani, 1993 ; AAWORD, 1995).
46 After independence in 1963, the government supported MYWO's mobilisation of women
networks primarily because it realised their value as a source of cheap well‑ organised
labour  for  nation‑building  (Nzomo  1993 :138).  Secondarily,  because  of  the  continued
interest  of  the British in funding the clubbing activities  that  they had initiated.  The
underlying motivation for the government's endorsement and support of  MYWO was
popularly viewed as a political strategy to gain access to these donor funds (Khasiani,
1993).  In  order  to  dissociate  MYWO  from  the  negative  connotation  inserted  by  the
colonialists' wives' clubs, the government introduced its own umbrella organisation in
1964,  namely,  the  National  Council  of  Women  in  Kenya  (NCWK).  It  offered  political
incentives to the NCWK, thereby formally defining its public role as being distinct and
separate from the MYWO's welfare role. The NCWK was co‑opted by the government to
represent  the  paradigmatic  shift  of  integrating  women in  public  affairs  and thereby
attract donor funds. The NCWK prioritised the government agenda, on the understanding
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and in anticipation of the fact that some of its members would be granted key political or
public positions (Nzomo, 1993).
47 The GAD framework of the "gender‑focused" development was ushered by the economic
crisis that was prevalent in the 1970's. This period coincided with the World Bank and
IMF imposition of SAPs as "the only reliable path to development". The impact of SAPs
was  a  dramatic  turnaround  in  capital  accounts  whereby  the  net  transfer  to  the
developing countries fell  from $US 44 billion in 1980 to minus $US 63 billion in 1989
(Woestman, 1994 :5). Countries like Kenya which had become so dependent on the export
of cash crops, were severely affected by the depressing trade and capital climate in the
1970s (Macharia, 1997 :29). Il was faced with external debt it could not service, severe
inflation, deteriorating economic output, trade and budget deficits and an inability to
attract development funds. In order to be eligible for the shrinking foreign investment,
loans and aid,  the government had to downsize its  inflated civil  service ;  devalue its
currency ; allowing the market to operate freely without price controls and subsidies ;
curtail the monopoly of agricultural boards to purchase, process and market cash crops
and  cut  back  its  subsidies  in  health,  education  and  social  amenities  (Macharia,
1997 :29‑30).
48 In the 1980's it was not enough to say that women had to be integrated in development,
but rather that they had to be integrated into the SAPs solutions to the economic crisis
(Woestman, 1994 ; Snyder and Tadesse, 1995). The World Bank claimed that "development
and growth arc best served when scarce public resources arc invested in women, where
they yield the highest economic and social returns" (Woestman, 1994 : 10). In response to
this  endorsement  by  the  World  Bank,  women  started  to  be  taken  seriously  by
policy‑makers, strategists and donors. GAD advocated that women needed to have "wider
control  over  and access  to"  political  power in order  to  achieve social  and economic
development that was geared towards human needs (Schuurman, 1993 :173). Women's
daily struggles, such as food prices, cost of living, drains to health and education, lack of
social  services evolve around these needs.  Since the se needs had become politicised
through the SAPs,  both western and local  feminists claimed that the y needed to be
addressed  politically.  Lack  of  "empowerment"  was  viewed  as  being  synonymous  to
women's struggles for survival since both tended to permeate into and order relations in
the home, the state and the workplace (Schuurman, 1993 :173 ; Moser, 1989).
49 Nowadays, Kenya gets little external financial support for development unless it shows
positive signs of economic recovery. Paradoxically, it is not likely to fulfil some of the
prescribed  criteria  pertaining  to  good  governance,  market  liberalisation  and  debt
restructuring  without  this  external  support.  Currently,  people's  "quality  of  life"
expectations  have  been  reduced  to  an  ail  time  low  due  to  the  SAPs'  imposed
unemployment,  inflation,  breakdown  of  health,  education,  social  services  and
infrastructure (Mach aria, 1997 :30). Criticising the SAPs, UNICEF asserted that "hundreds
of  thousands  of  the  developing  world's  children  have  given  their  lives  to  pay  their
countries' debts" (UNICEF, 1990 :26). Conversely, the World Bank insists that "investing in
women at this critical phase raises economic productivity, promotes a more efficient use
of resources, produces significant social returns, improves child survival, reduces fertility
and has considerable intergenerational payoffs" (Woestman, 1994 : 10).
50 The 1980's  triggered a  wave  of  development  pessimism that  was  crippling  theorists,
donors and activists (Schuurman, 1993 : 124). This was exacerbated by a rising tendency
to view development in terms of donor and recipient impasse, stagnation and fatigue. The
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SAPs,  fraught  with  contradictions  and  negative  (social,  economic  and  political)
repercussions, were also blamed for the prevalent development impasse. Western and
local feminists inherited this development vacuum, which was diffused with increasing
demands for sustainable development and economic recovery. They were faced with the
impossible challenge of stimulating support from policy‑makers and don ors who seemed
to have an increasingly diminished interest in development. The impact of SAPs coupled
with  the  drastic  recession  of  external  stimuli,  also  made  it  impossible  for  GAD  to
stimulate governmental commitment to their proposals. Development theorists, activists,
policy‑makers and donors as well as local political and elite bourgeoisie seemed to have
just  shifted  the  burden  of  sustainable  development  and  economic  recovery  to  their
women‑folk.
51 Kenya's  stagnant  and/or  deteriorating  economy has  influenced the  "gender‑focused"
development in the following manner. Firstly, it is preoccupied with short term policies
aimed at keeping the national economy stable in terms of debt and as such, can not take
the intermediate or long term policies promoted by "gender‑focused" development into
consideration. Secondly,  it  is preoccupied with seeking solutions to the widening gap
between the rich and poor which the latter are unlikely to bridge, whatever development
strategy they follow. Thirdly, "gender‑focused" development tends to be viewed by the
government as a stopgap solution to the current impasse, a plausible but yet untested
alternative and a "wait and see" approach. It is hardly surprising therefore, that Kenyan
women's  involvement  and  participation  in  development  only  amounts  to  a  shaky
enterprise with respect to the local political and elite bourgeoisie.
52 In the 1980' s, the WID and GAD approaches started to be criticised by local feminists as "a
cheap delivery system" for  SAP's  (Snyder and Tadesse,  1995 :  13).  Western feminists'
attempts to integrate local women in development was viewed as being superfluous since
they  were  already  well  integrated,  often  into  more  work  and  worse  conditions
(Schuurman,  1993 :171).  Also  criticised  was  their  tendency  to  ignore  the  conflicts  of
interest between men and women and within women's groups (Schuurman, 1993 :173).
Neither men nor women could not effect any real legislative changes in sexual equality
since  there  were no indicators  to  monitor  or  measure  them.  Moreover,  there  was  a
general reluctance amongst government officials, development bourgeoisie and even the
impoverished men to redistribute power to women. Local feminists claimed that "equity"
without any local economic growth or gain in power for women was self contradictory
(Moser, 1989).
53 The non‑elite women for whom the "gender‑focused" development is targeted, also tend
to regard it with a measure of scepticism rather than enthusiasm, derision rather than
hope and criticism rather than co‑operation. Nonetheless, most Kenyan women concur
with the fact that "gender‑focused" development has enabled them to raise issues that
had been ignored by both the colonial and the current government. As mentioned earlier,
women had already started to mobilise themselves into politically‑oriented groups during
the pre‑colonial and colonial eras. MYWO, under the leadership of Margaret Kenyatta
(the first president's daughter), organised the Kenya Women's Seminal' (1962 and J963)
and the East  Africa  Women's  Seminal'  (1964).  The purpose of  these seminars  was to
sensitise women about the important role they had to play in the newly independent
Kenya. Women were encouraged to organise themselves in registered groups so as to
raise  money  to  fund  their  job/skill  training  and  children's  education  (Snyder  and
Tadesse, 1995 :25). The post‑independence NCWK's euphoria was short‑lived because, not
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surprisingly, the government failed to honour the political incentives it had promised its
members.  However,  the  men besides  whom they had fought  during the  struggle for
independence  and  with  whom they  had  worked  in  various  nation‑building  projects,
received due political recognition for their efforts.
54 Since the 1960s, Kenyan women have organised themselves into groups through which
they articulated their social, political and/or economic ideals. Most of them tended to
adopt a harambee (Kiswahili term meaning lets pull together) "self‑help" approach which
is described in this article as being an "endogenous socialist". I have described it as being
"endogenous" because it emerges From and is embedded in local cultural practices of
pooled labour. It is also "socialist" because it emerges from and is perpetuated by local
communitarian ideals of working together for the betterment of the collective whole. The
harambee  approach  is  encapsulated  in  the  public  sphere  of  politics,  development,
economic affairs as well as the private sphere of familial integrity and local participation
in community affairs.
55 harambee  mobilises  individuals  within  ail  the  units  that  make  up  a  society,  to  "pull
together" both for financial as well as moral support. Any Kenyan, regardless of class,
gender, religious beliefs or political orientation, can apply for and get permission From
the appropriate local government representatives to initiate a harambee project or a fund
raising  drive.  harambee  is  viewed as  a  guiding  principle  for  mobilising  relatives  and
friends to construct a house, organise familial feasts (birth, wedding, graduation) and
settle outstanding bills  (school fees,  medical  bills,  funeral expenses).  It  also mobilises
members of a community to contribute similarly towards the achievement of public goals
that  have  profound  implications  on  their  private  life.  These  goals  include  the
construction  of  housing  units,  schools,  health  centres,  roads,  dams  etc.  Nowadays,
politicians  also  adopt  the  harambee  concept  to  mobilise  families,  communities,
constituencies and the country as a whole, to counter the negative effects of SAPs on
housing, education, health, food security. Most Kenyans, despite this highly publicised
and  politicised  image,  actively  and  voluntarily  contribute  their  money,  free  time,
expertise and labour to these projects.
The homogeneity of women’s networks.
56 The third fallacy is germane to both the WID and the GAD conceptualisation of women
networks. Firstly, the assumption that the existing and emergent women networks are
homogeneous. Secondly, the assumption that its members are mutually concerned with
addressing  common  issues.  These  assumptions  not  only  obscure  the  fact  that these
networks are rigidly stratified, but also the fact that only a small minority of women
benefit  from the  projects.  Moreover,  this  minority  tends  to  be  viewed by  the  other
women involved, as perpetuating or concretising a number of stereotypes about them.
This paper seeks to outline the three main clusters of women networks as well as the
underlying networking strategies that contribute to the heterogeneity of these networks
while consolidating the competing interests of its members.
57 The Gusii  tradition al  networking were structured around one or  a  few women who
demonstrably succeeded in becoming indispensable to other women by promoting their
shared interests. Young in‑married women tended to organise themselves around elderly
ones,  particularly when they were confronted with seemingly irreconcilable domestic
conflicts,  Women's  membership  and  belonging  within  such  networks  was  neither
permanent nor predictable. It was constantly shifting in response to the divergent needs
imposed by the stage in the life cycle and their contextual and marital realities. Some of
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the factors that precipitated women's networking included the following. Firstly, pooled
labour formed the basis by which women in the same neighbourhood assisted each other
during labour‑intensive peaks in their subsistence production. Secondly, it formed the
basis by which wives mutually rendered each other support after child‑birth or when one
of  them  was  un  able  to  fulfil  her  normal  functions  due  to  illness.  Thirdly,  wives
collectively shouldered the burden of their shared sorrows when confronted with poor
harvest and death. Fourthly, they collectively shared joys such as the naming ceremony
of infants,  the circumcision ceremony of their youth and the marriage of their adult
child‑bearing children.
58 The women's  networks  that  have  generally  emerged in  contemporary  Kenya  can be
divided  into  three  main  clusters.  Firstly,  the  networks  that  are  forged  to  alleviate
personal difficulty, secondly, those that are forged to promote collective interests and
finally,  those that  are forged as  income‑generating co‑operatives.  The first  cluster  is
basically consistent with the Gusii traditional networking whereby women radiated to
other women to mutually support each other and thereby affirm their shared joys and
sorrows. These networks emerge in response to women's increased pressure to fulfil their
subsistence  and  domestic  obligations  in  the  face  of  diminishing  family  labour  and
economic contributions. They are particularly important in enabling women who migrate
to  urban  centres  and  are  cut  off  from their  extended  family  support,  to  cope  with
isolation and the attendant social marginalisation due to poverty and domestic violence
(Kinuthia, 1993 :39).
59 This networking strategy, which is synonymous to the harambee approach, is adopted by
ail Kenyans irrespective of gender and class distinction. However, most women and men
who  adopt  this  strategy  do  not  necessarily  register  their  group  as  an  NGO.  These
networks,  which  comprise  of  loosely  structured  groups  of  friends,  neighbours  and
members of a common cultural background are usually privately organised. Members of
common ethnic and/or religious affiliations sometimes form registered NGOs e.g. "The
Gusii  Catholic Women Association (GCWA)".  Nonetheless,  the main reason that draws
them together is a "survivalist" need to cope with their mutual suffering rather than
ideological, religious, political or even cultural reasons.
60 The  second  cluster  of  women  networks  is  also  reflective  of  the  Gusii  traditional
networking whereby a number of influential elderly women contributed to the activities
of other women for pragmatic and opportunistic reasons rather than "survivalist" ones.
Nowadays, the encroachment of market integration and the reality of existing in abject
poverty  has  compelled  many  of  women  to  engage  in  a  variety  of  informal
income‑generating  activities.  Their  participation  in  these  activities  is  utilitarian
inasmuch as the collective projects they promote, serve the interests of their husbands
and children, thereby residually trickling down to each of them. These projects include
on  a  macro‑level,  formal  fund‑raising  and  voluntary  labour  contribution  for  the
construction of schools, health centres and communal facilities. On a micro‑level they
include  fund‑raising  for  fees,  medical  bills  and  the  creation  of  informal  trade
opportunities in the community (Kinuthia, 1993). The motivation for membership and
participation within these networks usually emanates from charitable ideals  but  also
encapsulates, to a greater or lesser extent, social and political activism.
61 This cluster is usually formalised into registered NGO's and "self‑help" harambee groups.
The interests of the members within these networks range from tangible goals such as
those  mentioned  above,  to  abstract  ones  such  as  population  control,  environmental
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protection, human rights intervention, equal opportunity lobbying etc. Groups engaged
in  achieving  the  se  abstract  goals  usually  comprise  of  a  selective  number  of  female
academic and political elite. In the aforementioned Gusii NGO, these women are referred
to as "the mothers‑in‑law" (chikorera) because they usually have senior positions in either
the MYWO or NCWK. Paradoxically, women who represent their groups in these umbrella
organisations, are looked down upon by members of the NGOs they represent. They are
regarded by these women as being "those who (think they) are worldly and wealthy" and
"those who have the time and money to engage in philanthropic and political pursuits.
They are often denigrated by the women they represent as being "bigger than men",
"eating  their  sons"  or  "emasculating  their  husbands"  because  of  their  propensity  of
encroaching on male spheres of influence (Bulow, 1992). Conversely, the y tend to view
themselves as being social facilitators engaged in one way or the other,  in the [male
dominated]  theatrics  of  policy‑formulation  and  decision‑making.  Their  agenda  and
mission statement usually coincides with western feminists ideals for the promotion of
women's emancipation, autonomy, empowerment and equality.
62 This third cluster is similar to the Gusii traditional networking whereby pooled labour
and  mutual  exchange  of  goods  and  services  enabled  individual women  to  produce
agricultural surplus. The invaluable information they gleaned from other women enabled
a number of them to improve their economic, political and social status and by extension,
that of their respective husbands and sons. Similarly, this cluster of networks can best be
described  as  an  amalgamation  of  loosely  structured  sub‑clusters  of  women,  drawn
together by a common interest and yet at the same time, fraught with internal conflicts,
divided interests and mutual suspicion. Its members are acutely attuned to the on‑going
shifts in donor funding preference. They keep abreast with the global ebb and flow of
gender‑focus and thereby design their project proposals accordingly so as to maximise
their  chances  of  eligibility  for  funding.  This  form  of  networking,  which  has  been
described  as  public  service  contracting,  usually  meets  an  important  donor  need  of
delivering services for long‑term goals,  in short‑term project  funding bursts (Korten,
1993 : 17). When funds run out or when the service has failed or been fulfilled, these
networks tend to disband or seek alternative projects in response to new donors needs
(Kinuthia, 1993).
63 Structured around registered non‑profit NGO's or co‑operative groups, these networks
tend to have a formal leadership hierarchy that is comprised of a chair‑person, treasurer
and secretary who make up the administrative board. This board is elected annually or
bi‑annually by members, whose membership to the group is conditional on the payment
of a stipulated fee. Publicly, these networks usually tend to maintain a facade of having
homogeneous interests so as to be eligible for funding. However, in practice, they are
often characterised by their heterogeneity in membership,  ideology and flexibility to
respond to donor preferences. Although they are designed for income‑generation, most
of these NGO's are structurally non‑profit. Many of them incur such high overhead costs,
that  the  profit  margin is  minimal  and the financial  returns  that  trickle  down to  its
members are insignificant. The reason for this disproportionately high costs is usually
blamed on corruption and mis‑appropriation of  funds  by  one  or  more  of  the  board
members. Also criticised is the lack of cohesive ideology and the general ignorance or
powerlessness of a majority of its members. Donors who impose stringent conditions for
funding and compel women to strive for unrealistic and impracticable goals, have also
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contributed to the diminishing returns of these networks (Kameri‑Mbote and Kiai, 1993 ;
Kabira and Nzioki, 1993).
64 These  second  and  third  clusters  of  women  networking  are  represented  by  the  two
umbrella  organisations,  namely,  MYWO  and  NCWK.  These  organisations  are  often
depicted in discourse as being on opposite ends of a continuum (Kameri‑Mbote and Kiai,
1993). The NCWK on the one hand, tends to represent urban‑based networks of women
elite, that focus on women's empowerment as well as environmental and humanitarian
issues. On the other hand, MYWO tends to represent rural‑based "grass‑root" networks of
impoverished,  non‑elite  women.  The  NCWK represents the  most  outspoken women's
groups, some of which have been credited for their success in challenging government
decisions about  the environment and human rights.  The most  celebrated case is  the
Green Belt Movement's battle and success in stopping the government from erecting a
skyscraper in the middle of one of the largest recreational parks in Nairobi. Conversely,
the MYWO not only shies away from controversial issues but also dissociates itself from
the NCWK's radical stance and opposition to unfavourable government policies.
65 Umbrella organisations such as the MYWO have been described elsewhere as being "an
extension of governmental authority, created to promote its agenda, and by implication,
the  interests  of  those  who  control  its  instruments  of  power" (Korten,  1993).  Such
organisations,  which  are  known  by  the  anomalous  term  "governmental
non‑governmental organisations (GONGO), are also created in response to the dominant
development  discourse  and  donors'  funding  interest.  GONGO's  are  co‑opted  by  the
government so as to facilitate its indirect usurpation of donor funds hence they tend to
be  viewed as  a  compromise  that  promotes  ail  the  involved parties'  interests.  In  the
Kenyan context, umbrella organisations such as NCWK and MYWO are good examples of
GONGO's  whereby  the  former  is  criticised  because  of  tendency  to  challenge  the
government while the latter is praised because of its conformity.
66 Women's networking strategies are not so clear cut hence it is not unusual for women to
seek membership in a variety of registered networks which are affiliated to either MYWO
or NCWK.  Similarly,  it  is  not  unusual  for  members of  unregistered networks to seek
successive  and  concurrent  membership  to  a  variety  of  these  registered  NGO's.  The
heterogeneity of women's networking strategies is therefore characterised and shaped by
its  members  compulsive  engagement  in  a  repertoire  of  development  discourses  that
sometimes contradict each other. This propensity for multiple membership can be viewed
as a measure of challenging three levels of influence. Firstly, the self‑acclaimed authority
and spokesman‑ship of women elite that is viewed by the poor, illiterate and the rural
women  as  being  equally  and  sometimes  worse  than  male influence.  Secondly,  the
non‑legitimate intrusion of men into the female spheres of influence that has paved the
way for their usurpation of women's autonomy and increased responsibilities they have
to shoulder. Thirdly, a desire to cash in on the donor funds so as to raise capital to invest
in their families' subsistence, create or expand their businesses and/or promote their
feminist, idealist and/or political interests.
The valuation of the women’s bureau in the context of "gender‑focused" development
67 The fourth fallacy pertains to the so‑called "gender‑focused" development successes. A
case in point is the introduction of Women's Bureau (referred to in this paper as WB),
which is presented as being one of the most important triumphs of both the WID and GAD
interventions. The WB is viewed by man y women who feel excluded from its benefits as
precipitating a repertoire of betrayals that are toted as triumphs. Similarly, the findings
Enduring passions : The fallacies of "gender‑focused" development in Kenya...
Bulletin de l'APAD, 20 | 2000
19
of  this paper  seem  to  suggest  that  rather  than  being  a  banner  of  success,  the  WB
epitomises and perpetuates the afore mentioned fallacies. These in their turn, have singly
or in combination with other related factors,  contributed to the continued failure of
"gender‑focused" development.
68 The aftermath of  the "UN end of  the Women's  decade" conference that  was held in
Nairobi in 1985, triggered a number of national actions such as the Forward Looking
Strategies to the Year 2000, the Plan for Action and the Programme for Action. These
actions called upon governments to "identify the impact unemployment has on women ;
provide employment equity programmes ; provide equal access to ail jobs and training for
women ; improve conditions of the formal and informal labour markets ; recognise and
encourage  the  small  business  initiatives  of  women ;  provide  and  encourage  the
establishment  of  child‑care  facilities ;  and  encourage,  through  education  and  public
information the sharing of responsibilities for child and domestic care between men and
women" (O'Neal, 1986 :20). The engagement NCWK's members in these actions, coupled
with their  attendant lobbying and activism in demanding for favourable government
policies increased public awareness of women's issues. This in turn triggered a dramatic
rise  in  MYWO's  NGO  registration  as  well  as  a  more  concerted  articulation  of
"gender‑focused" development.
69 The co‑ordinated NCWK and MYWO actions led to a breakthrough in 1984,  when the
government created a Women's Bureau (WB) sector within the Ministry of Culture and
Development  (Khasiani,  1993).  The  WB's  governmental  mandate  was  to  "formulate
policies affecting gender issues and women' s overall integration on society ; co‑ordinate
and  harmonise  women's  activities  performed  by  government  ministries  and  NGO's ;
collect and analyse data on expatriate project and donor proposals ; co‑ordinate, monitor
and evaluate women's projects ; provide the government and don ors with feedback on
on‑going  projects ;  train,  sensitise  and  mobilise  women's  "self‑help"  initiatives"
(Khasiani,  1993 :  124).  The government also responded by revitalising the mandate of
MYWO with political and economic incentives. Emboldened by the governmental stamp
of approval, MYWO withdrew its affiliation from the NCWK taking with it the bulk of the
grass‑root organisations that had remained loyal to the organisation over the years.
70 The creation of the WB coincided with MYWO's affiliation with the ruling party KANU,
which  thereafter  adopted  the  new  title  KANU‑MYWO.  According  to  Khasiani,  the
government encouraged the co‑operation between KANU‑MYWO and the WB so as to
hasten the mobilisation and registration of women into groups (1993 :124). Thus while the
latter  was  mandated  to  register,  the  former  was  charged  with  the  responsibility  of
mobilising its current and emergent members. The government shifted its support from
NCWK to MYWO because the latter was already established at the rural sector and was
viewed by donors as being more representative of the grass‑root reality.
71 Conversely, it tended to view the NCWK as a threat to its hegemony, which comprised of a
well  entrenched  male  majority.  NCWK's  combatant  approach  was  simultaneously  its
source of power and autonomy to resist external influence as well as the reason it failed
to  stimulate  representative  grass‑root  participation.  Most  of  the  registered  NGO's
affiliated  themselves  with  MYWO primarily  because  of  its  success  in  attracting  both
donor  funding  and  governmental  endorsement.  Women  were  disillusioned  by  the
complacency and non‑assuming attitudes of the MYWO, however, they were even less
impressed by the demanding and aggressive attitudes of the NCWK (Khasiani, 1993).
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72 Today, the government's attitude towards the KANU‑MYWO is no different from the one
that  was  adopted  by  the  colonial  one  towards  their  clubbing  activities  in  1952.  The
organisation, which was created to suit the interest of the colonial government, has been
co‑opted by  the  current  one in  a  similar  manner,  so  as  to  promote  its  agenda.  The
government tends to stifle the agency of KANU‑MYWO's leaders by paying "lip service" to
their proposed social,  economic,  legal  and political  reforms but resorting to delaying
tactics when it comes to implementation. Other strategies include making token changes,
installing figurehead organisations, shelving/postponing urgent documents or refusing
to comply with women's legitimate demands for legal  and political  reforms (Khasiani,
1993 ; Oduol, 1993 ; Omosa, 1995).
73 Politicians often publicly ridicule key representatives of KANU‑MYWO and NCWK e.g. in
his  inaugural  speech  at  the  "East  African  Women Parliamentarians'  Conference  (8th
March 2001), the president blamed women for not achieving the goals that they had set
themselves. He is cited in the papers as saying "you can achieve more ! can get more ! But
because of your little minds, you can not get what you are expected to get !  " (Daily
Nation,  2001).  These  comments  fuelled  the  inherent  dissent  among  members  of
KANU‑MYWO and those of NCWK whereby the latter accused the former of consorting
with the government in a manner that invited such a contemptuous reaction. NCWK also
accused the KANU‑MYWO leadership structure as being comprised of "wives, daughters
and  sisters  of  politicians"  who  have  to  succumb  to  the  government's  every  whim
(Khasiani, 1993). Similarly accused were the politicians who offered financial and political
incentives  when  they  needed  KANU‑MYWO's  assistance  but  failed  to  honour  their
promises when they felt that their patronage had ceased to be functional to their needs
(Khasiani, 1993).
An overview of the WB's GAD‑based initiatives
74 The WB, implemented the "Forward Looking Strategies" in accordance with the GAD
framework. It is the officially recognised body responsible for co‑ordinating NGO's that
are committed to raising women's status from welfare to empowerment. It promotes the
activities of NGO's which are engaged in lobbying for the ratification of laws that impinge
upon women's  rights.  It  also  subsidises  "legal  clinics"  which offer  women free  legal
services. It co‑ordinates the activities of NGO's which provide women with loans that
would enable them to engage in informal trade and small‑scale businesses. And finally, it
co‑ordinates the activities of NGO's engaged in raising women's awareness of their voters
rights or subsidising election expenses of aspiring politicians.
Women and the law
75 A survey conducted in 1981 by Women's Rights Awareness Programme, determined that
women's non‑use of the legal process was due to the fact that most of them were ignorant
of their constitution al rights. Accordingly, the Public Law Institute (PLI) was established
to provide legal support to women, whose ignorance or poverty had structurally excluded
them from legal representation and recompense. It was also aimed at advocating for the
ratification  of  laws  that  impinge  on  women's  rights  such as  family  laws  concerning
marriage, divorce, child support/custody and pro pert y laws concerning succession and
inheritance (Kameri‑Mbote, 1995. The PLI is viewed as the main channel through which
the WB intervenes on behalf of NGO's engaged in women's legal empowerment, public
interest litigation, legal education, legal aid and research. However, politicians usually
respond to its recommendations with counter‑accusations that these are contrary to the
customary law.
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76 In  a  1985  parliamentary  discussion  on  the  status  of  women  in  marriage,  politicians
claimed that "a husband has a right to discipline his women" (Amnesty International,
1995). Ministers, in the guise of protecting the sanctity of the institution of marriage,
objected to any external interference with a husband's right to chastise his wives and
daughters. Accordingly, they failed to pass the Marriage Bill that accorded equal rights to
spouses in matters concerning the allocation, control and authority over matrimonial
property,  child  custody,  divorce  and  inheritance.  They  also  turned  down  the  PLI's
petition to ratify laws that prevented women from seeking divorce in proven cases of
adultery.  Customary  laws  on  polygamy  tend  to  override  women's  objection  to  their
husband's  successive  marriages  (Kameri‑Mbote,  1995).  However,  polygamy  as  it  is
practised today, is no different from having a series of mistresses who are committed to
one man. These women are neither accorded a respectable social status nor guaranteed
any  legal  security (De  Temmerman,  1995 ;  Odhiambo‑Oduol,  1995).  Men  reinterpret
customary law so as  to  justify  their  (often forcible)  usurpation of  their  womenfolk's
earnings and non‑legitimate impingement of their rights to property and inheritance
(Omosa, 1995).
Women in business
77 The  Kenya  Business  and  Professional  Women's  Club  and  the  Association  of  African
Women in Research and Development were created to stimulate women's participation in
high salaried sectors of the economy. The WB established the Kenya Women's Finance
Trust with the Women's World Banking as the guarantor. The Trust is mandated by the
WB to facilitate women entrepreneurs with a credit guarantee scheme. It finances small
scale  ventures  and  loosely  structured  commercial  and  service  businesses  that  are
otherwise  not  funded by commercial  banks  and related financial  institutions.  It  also
invests in the managerial training of women interested in engaging in such small scale
trade ventures. In spite of the apparent success of the trust in subsidising the necessary
training  and administering  the  necessary  loans,  its  internal  administration has  been
described as being amateur, corrupt and non‑professional (Omosa, 1995).
78 The Trust has been criticised for fading to monitor, evaluate and assess the continued
sustainability  and  economic viability  of  the  funded  businesses  as  well  as  the
disproportionate  rate  of  loan  non‑payment.  Its  inherent  female‑bias  has  also  been
criticised, particularly when it excludes men who are equally qualified to benefit from it.
Some of the se men include those who engage in small scale and informal businesses that
have in the past been associated with women. These businesses are popularly referred to
as "hot sun" (jua kali) because they are conducted in the open‑air rather than enclosed
markets (Macharia, 1997). They include furniture‑making, dress making, hair‑dressing,
meat roasting, [vigilante] security from government repression, the sale of second hand
clothing and recycling of scrap metal in the market (1997 : 35‑49).
Women in politics
79 The introduction of multi‑party politics in 1992, triggered a renewed awareness of the
disproportionate representation of women in politics. A survey conducted by the National
Committee on the Status of Women determined that this disparity was due to women's
ignorance of the voting procedure. The WB established the Women's Voters League and
the National Committee for the Advancement of Women‑KANU 92, to mobilise women's
engagement  in  politics,  by  raising  their  awareness  of  voting  procedures.  These
organisations  were  also  established  as  a  measure  of  providing  moral  and  financial
support to aspiring women politicians (Oduol, 1993). However, they fail to appeal to the
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majority of the women to whom their services are targeted. They have been criticised for
their  asymmetrical  representation  of  impoverished,  rural  or  illiterate  women.  Also
criticised is their female‑bias which excludes an equally compelling number of men who
are just as ignorant of their voting rights as the women they represent. 
An overview of WB's WID based initiatives
80 The  WB  is  also  the  official  co‑ordinating  body  through  which  WID  policies  are
implemented and don or funds channelled to NGO's. Its activities are supposed to cohere
with those of the government strategy for the implementation of the "District Focus for
Rural  Development"  that  was  established  in  1985.  Consequently,  it  monitors  and
evaluates NGO proposal for expatriate recruitment and donor support on behalf of the
District Co‑ordinating Committee (Nzomo, 1997). The WB, working in conjunction with
researchers, donor agencies and government official, determines the economic viability
of  women's  income‑generating  projects.  It  is  on  the  basis  of  the  top‑down
recommendations  of  these  four  bodies  that  decisions  are  made  as  to  whether  an
organisation needs 50 chicken per 100 women or 1 pig per 20 women to attain the desired
bottom‑up solutions.
81 The WB targets impoverished, rural‑based illiterate women, singling out female‑headed
families as its priority. Adopting the Household Unit Principle (Ventura‑Dias, 1985 : 157)
the WB assumes that these families represent the most vulnerable group of women. The
HUP presumes that a household is an undifferentiated unit wherein women can improve
their lot and have full autonomy in what they produce (Stamp, 1989). The underlying
assumption is that these women would be able to market their products and expand their
production  by  determining  their  own  reinvestment  options  (Ventura‑Dias,  1985).  In
reality,  ail  Kenyan families  tend to be structured around the woman or women who
provide for their subsistence and welfare. However, a distinction is made as to whether a
woman is married or not and whether she heads the family as the biological mother or
female guardian such as co‑wife, sibling, aunt or grandmother. This in turn, is influenced
by such considerations as the male members of nuclear or extended family networks who
are ritually and jurally obliged to censure that these women are able to fulfil their role.
Female‑headed homes are therefore considered as being male‑controlled, by men who
may or may not be in permanent residence but who are nonetheless, legally obliged by
the law to act on women's behalf.
82 Projects that target female‑headed families tend to fail primarily because of a lack of
consensus in their definition and scope. Secondarily,  they tend to aggravate inherent
claims to  women's  productivity  whereby their  individual  share  is  minimal  and their
status worse off . They fail to take into account the fact that women have to share their
money amongst the various immediate and extended family who have a vested interest in
their welfare. Moreover, when they focus on women in the rural sector they tend to
overlook the fact that these women's activities are influenced by relatives who also feel
entitled to a share of the benefits, man y of whom are widely dispersed in various parts of
the  country.  The  WB,  in  countering  these  negative  repercussions  of  targeting
female‑headed families in the rural sector, tend to recruit men or male representatives in
managerial  positions.  In  this  sense,  the  household  continues  to  be  perceived  as  an
important economic unit to determine the efficacious use of the allocated appropriate
technology. However, men arc depicted the legal representatives of the women, who in
their  turn  are  the  ultimate  users  and  beneficiaries.  The  WB  has  the  propensity  of
inserting an artificial gradation of recipients whereby they receive the funds and allocate
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it via (male) extension workers. These in their turn, impart the necessary technological
know‑how (expertise) and control  of  user  rights  to male household heads.  Husbands
therefore manage the equipment (implementers),  determine how wives should use it
(facilitators)  and  arc  consulted  by  WB  representatives  about  the  progress  (project
evaluators) (Stamp, 1989 : 153).
83 The WB promotes income‑generating projects are designed for poverty‑alleviation and
the  provision  of  basic  welfare  needs  and  not  for  economic  expansion.  Few of  them
succeed in generating income let al one stimulating economic growth. This failure may be
attributed to a conceptual error in the formulation of these projects but unfortunately,
tendency is to shift the blame on the women for whom the y are targeted. Since many of
them are illiterate, evaluators tend to blame project failure on their ignorance and their
Jack of the technological know‑how. This obscures other related issues : firstly, the fact
that the introduced technology has to be shared by so many women that their traditional
horticultural technology proves to be more efficient in the long run. Secondly, the fact
that many women's user rights are compromised when the necessary information and
the authority to decide who, when and how long to use a donor‑sponsored appropriate
technology are transmitted to men.  This  is  particularly the case when the latter are
perceived by the women as being ill‑qualified to discern the practicalities involved in
using the equipment for which they are responsible.
84 Projects which fail to transmit the necessary managerial, marketing and technological
responsibilities to women, not only fall short of their desired economic viability but also
their expectations for attaining entrepreneural success (Kabira & Nzioki, 1993). Many of
them also fail to generate the desired income, primarily because of the disproportionate
labour/time/overhead  costs.  Secondarily  because  they  tend  to be  duplicated  in
concentrated areas that share a common market, thus compromising their marketability
at  the  onset.  However,  the  most  compelling  reason  for  the  apparent  failure  of
income‑generating projects  has to do with the fact  that  the women involved do not
recognise or  accept  these projects  as  being their  own.  They invariably depersonalise
donor‑imposed projects by tagging them with nicknames such as the "bureau chicken",
the "government cow" and the "World Bank water project" (Kabira and Nzioki, 1993).
Some  of  them  neglect  the  donated  equipment  and  opt  for  their  more  familial
horticultural  economy (see  also  Jackson,  1978).  While  others  invest  less  time  in  the
imposed projects and devise "self‑help harambee and/or alternative income‑generating
initiatives (Omosa, 1995).
85 Women criticise the tendency of local and donor bourgeoisie to promote contradictory
investment  options  that  shift  the  burden  of  development  to  the  rural  sector  while
strategically denying it the necessary structural resources (Nzomo, 1997). This conflict of
interests has the impact of legitimising their inertia to deal with the real issues that have
contributed to the current economic crisis (see also Haugerud, 1993). Firstly, both fail to
acknowledge that poverty and social marginalisation differentially compel both rural and
urban women to  accept  whatever  assistance  they  are  offered.  Secondly,  they  fail  to
recognise  some of  the  endogenous  forms of  resistance and expressions  of  autonomy
through which women choose to accept or reject the limited options they are presented.
Thirdly, they deliberately ignore the fact that the current economic crisis which permeates
both the rural and urban sectors, is characterised by comparable asymmetrical diffusions
of cultural, demographic, socio‑economic, political and even global inter‑penetration.
The Women's Bureau : a plethora of competing and conflicting interests
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86 The WB is viewed by the women for whom it is  targeted,  as promoting the multiple
agendas  of  western  feminists,  local  women  elite,  local  male  bourgeoisie  and
male‑dominated foreign donors (referred to in the rest of this article as the "big 4")
(Kinuthia, 1993). The "big 4", in the guise of alleviating the constraints of women, are
differentially  driven  to  compete  against  each  other  and  thereby  promote  the  own
interests  (see  also  Jaggar,  1993).  Accordingly,  the  y  tend  to  design  policies  that  are
conceptually flawed in their favour and to implement projects that are structurally biased
against women. The women for whom its benefits are targeted, are obliged to conform to
peculiar notions of their production and status in society so as to be legible for funding.
Furthermore, the WB is compromised by the underlying feminist undertones that depict
local women as being passive, downtrodden and powerless while portraying the "big 4" as
being active, dominant and in control. These gender stereotypes not only tend to be an
abstraction of the gender reality at the local scene but also tend to obscure the "big 4's"
hidden agenda. The competing interests and power struggles of the "big 4" are often
transposed upon and perpetuated by the WB. Since the WB is designed to promote the
"big 4's" agenda, it fails to act in their interest of the women it supposedly represents.
WB's failure is also attributed to the fact that it under‑funded and attached to a sector of
the Ministry of Social an Cultural Services, which addresses marginal issues pertaining to
the handicapped, the street children, the homeless and the aged (Nzomo, 1997).
87 The WB triggers a sense of disillusionment and scepticism amongst Kenyans because of its
propensity to grossly misrepresent women's agency in development. Also criticised is its
propensity promote feminist interests in development, by capitalising on local women's
agency, without necessarily crediting the latter for their achievements. Local feminists
have also been accused of attempting to "establish their authority on the backs of other
women, determining for them the meanings and goals of their lives" (see also Ong, 1988).
Today, Kenyans are increasingly opting for the harambee approach, both as a measure of
resisting the imposition of both western and local feminists and as means of tempering
the anomie inserted by development. They nevertheless maintain their membership to
registered  organisations  so  as  to  gain  legitimacy  when  trying  to  attract  potential
independent donors. In integrating the harambee approach to their networking strategy,
women not only mobilise themselves into action but also affirm certain development
ideals which they find lacking in the "gender‑focused" development.
Conclusion
88 The current  "gender‑focused" development,  while  supposedly taking into account  ail
aspects of men and women's relations, tends to obscure the diffusion of roles that have
emerged as a consequence of the economic crisis and SAP's‑imposed repercussions. It
promotes  western  and  local feminists'  interests  in  challenging  and  countering  the
monopoly of male bourgeoisie. These feminist strategies have had the impact of inserting
a new class of women bourgeoisie who behave in a combatant manner towards their
husbands and sons so as  to promote this  western ideology of  autonomy.  Conversely,
women's autonomy emerges from and is sustained by their capacity to promote their
husbands' and sons' interests. Projects which exclude men fail to take into consideration
a  number  of  idiosyncratic  culture‑based  and  context‑specific  factors,  from  which
women's autonomy emerges.
89 In Kenya,  "gender‑focused" development  tends to  be conceptually  flawed due to  the
tendency of women elite and the government to deprive, limit or distort the relevant
facts about the reality of existing on the very fringes of survival.  They ignore, either
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willingly or passively, the very conditions of the women on whose behalf they pretend to
act. As a result, the "gender‑focused" projects that they promote, tend to be doomed to
fail because they do not fit with the contextual reality. Moreover, they tend to promote
the Kenyan "politics of bribery and clientelism" whereby one needs to know someone
who can connect him or her to the don or funds. However, to get either this "connected"
individual or a legitimate share of the donor funds, one is obliged to give something
equivalent  in  return.  The people  who design projects  do  not  necessarily  know their
targets  or  have  any  control  over  those  who receive  the  funding  or  the  appropriate
technology. Accordingly, those who receive it are relatively free to use it in a manner,
other than the one specified in their initial proposal. In the Gusii context, women often
look up to their educated and sometimes wealthy or politically influential relatives in
order to gain access to donor funds. These relatives, in their turn, can only legitimately
gain access to funds in the name of the rural networks they represent. The Gusii do not
seem object when these relatives invest some of the donated money in trade or politics
since they often claim "it was not ours anyway". However, the y find it offensive when
these urban relatives, by virtue of having acquired the funds, presume that the y can
dictate to them how to invest it. 
90 Men and women's roles tend to alter through contact with other cultures and economic
systems. Yet, their views on men and women's relative status remains connected to their
underlying cultural  valuations  of  maleness  and femaleness.  These  men and women's
partially  transformed  valuations  need  to  be  respected  and  integrated  into
"gender‑focused" policies in their own terms, no matter how controversial, divergent or
contradictory  they  are  to  politicians,  feminists  and donors.  Men seem to  be  equally
driven and motivated as women to participate in "gender‑focused" development. 
91 However, when "gender‑focused" policies are based upon certain misconceptions about
the position of men, the position of women and the position of men with respect to
women,  they  paradoxically  sustain  the  conditions  the  y  set  out  to  diffuse.  This  is
particularly  the  case  when  they  inadvertently  perpetuate  or  exacerbate  the  gender
asymmetries that both men and women are confronted and have to cope with in their
day‑to‑day interaction. In some cases, they may even insert unfamiliar gender values that
are otherwise absent, thus unnecessarily pitting men and women against each other.
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